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WAGES AND TAXES-A SURETY'S HEADACHE
By PAUL E. ANDERSON*
Every so often the tax services and their advance sheets reveal a spate
of cases that leads one to suspect the Internal Revenue Service of initiating a
calculated drive to establish by litigation rather than by statutory amend-
ment a new concept of tax or of tax responsibility. During the past three years,
such evidence has appeared in the suretyship field. From these cases, it is
apparent that the service (nee bureau) has organized an energetic and in-
tensive effort to reduce the benefits of the surety-principal relationship to
its possession. It is from these cases that this article is drawn.
Ordinarily a taxpayer need worry only about its own taxes. Up to a few
short years ago this was true in the suretyship field as well. The surety took
care of its taxes and its principals paid their own. No attempt was made by
the service to execute against a surety warrants for unpaid taxes outstanding
against its principal.' One good reason for this state of circumstances un-
doubtedly was the fact that the surety nowhere guaranteed its principal's
taxes. The normal suretyship contract spoke only of bonding performance or
of protecting the owner against laborers' and materialmen's claims or liens.
But there is just where the trouble began. Some farsighted and ingenious ad-
ministrator in the service asked this question: Are not certain employment
taxes just as much a part of wages paid as the net-take-home-pay of the em-
ployee is? And, if so, doesn't the surety guarantee their payment to the gov-
ernment just as it warrants the payment of the take-home portion? The answer
to this question has consumed much time and energy of government, of
sureties and of courts.
The usual situation under which this question and its progeny arise is
as follows: An owner of land, desiring certain improvements to be made,
hires a contractor to construct the improvements for him. In order to assure
himself against the possible default of the contractor and against the claims
and liens of the contractors' creditors attendant to such default, the owner
will insist that the contractor post a bond guaranteeing faithful performance.!
Suppose then the contractor proceeds with the job, incurring among other
*A.B. 1948, J.D. 1950, University of Michigan; formerly instructor, Stanford Law School, Spec.
Assistant to Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue; Member of San Francisco Bar. Associated
in practice with firm of Kent and Brookes.
'The only controversy then arising between a surety and the then Bureau of Internal Revenue
was a matter of priority of their competing claims to the contractor-taxpayer's assets. Of this con-
flict more will be said below in Part D.
'The other basic type of construction bond is one conditioned to secure the owner against
laborers' and materialmen's claims and liens. Most of this analysis, except that relating to the
surety's liability upon its bond for "wages," will not be applicable. Naturally, the application of the
principles developed in this article will depend in large measure upon the terms of the suretyship
contract in each case. The many variations of contract and their respective effects are left to the
expert in suretyship law.
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debts, liability as employer for various federal employment taxes.' Suppose
further that the contractor runs out of funds before the job is finished and
leaves unpaid most of these claims and taxes. What-then should the surety do?
Should it merely pay off all claims, leaving the project uncompleted and for-
feiting any claim to any part of the contract price withheld by the owner?
Or should it advance funds to the contractor and assist the contractor in
completing the project? The latter is an alternative often adopted, since in
many cases it serves to minimize the surety's loss. Consequently, we shall
commence this analysis on the assumption that our surety has decided to step
in to see what it can salvage from the default and to attempt by all possible
means to have the contract completed.
If the surety does step in to give its assistance in completing the job, it
may obligate itself for past and future employment taxes under certain cir-
cumstances. It is the purpose of this article to examine those circumstances
and to suggest to sureties possible and feasible alternatives to a manner of
operation which would clearly subject them to liability as an involuntary
employer.
The basic theories underlying the possible personal liability of a surety
under the above hypothetical case are three: (1) the surety has, under the
concepts of the tax statute, assumed the position of employer and is therefore
liable to the federal government for all taxes levied upon an employer;
(2) the surety has incurred liability by the mere act of paying wages due;
and (3) the surety, although not an employer, has by the terms of his con-
tract obligated himself to pay the employment taxes of his principal to the
United States. Additionally, the surety, although not personally liable, may
find itself subordinated to the government's claim for taxes and therefore be
unable to recoup its losses. Each of these possibilities will be considered
seriatim.
A. The Surety as Employer.
(1) The Common Law Tests.
Under what circumstances does a surety for a defaulted contractor
become the employer of the workers completing the job? Normally these men
are or were the employees of the principal, who, in most cases, continues to
keep payroll and personnel records on them. The question to be determined
'Specifically, by employment taxes we mean the following: first, the taxes collected from the
employer based upon his withholding from the gross wages of the employee-the "Collection of
Income Tax at Source on Wages Act" (§ § 1621-1627 of the Internal Revenue Code, commonly
known as the "withheld income tax" and referred to herein as such or as W.H. taxes) and the
"Federal Insurance Contributions Act"'(§ § 1400-1432 I.R.C., commonly known as F.I.C.A. taxes),
and, second, taxes collected from the employer measured by payrolls but not subject to with-
holding, such as the "Federal Unemployment Tax Act" (§ § 1600-1611 I.R.C., commonly known as
F.U.T.) The regulations of the Treasury Department relating to the withheld income tax are found
in U.S. Treas. Reg. 120; of F.I.C.A. taxes m U.S. Treas. Reg. 128; and of F.U.T. taxes in U.S.
Treas. Reg. 107.
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then is whether or not the defaulted contractor has been displaced in the
employment relationship by the surety-clearly a more difficult matter for
the tax collector to prove than the establishment of the initial employment
relationship. The question of proof becomes all the more difficult if the de-
faulted contractor retains a few of the strings of the original cord of employ-
ment between himself and his workers.' If sufficient strings are retained, as
pointed out below, the defaulted contractor remains the employer for the
purpose of paying the employment taxes.
The statutes give but little help in determining the number and nature
of the strings required to braid the cord of employment; their approach is
merely to incorporate the common law concept of employment into the
statutory definition of an employee. Thus section 1426(d) (F.I.C.A.) reads,
"The term 'employee' means . .. (2) any individual who, under the usual
common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee rela-
tionship, has the status of an employee . . . "The converse of this definition
would logically define the status of employer.' Section 1607 (i) (F.U.T.)
also contents itself with defining an employee, but does it negatively- "the
term employee . . .does not include . . . (2) any individual . . .who
is not an employee under such common law rules." Section 1621 (d) (WH)
disregards the common law concept of employment to say straight out, "The
term 'employer' means the person for whom an individual performs or per-
formed any service, of whatever nature, as the employee of such person."6
What do the regulations add that is of help to the surety9 First, he
must note that the tests provided under each of the regulations are worded
in the same language, despite the difference in the statutes pointed out above.7
'These statements are not made in reference to the judicial concept of burden of proof, wnch,
of course, always rests on the surety in a trial of the issue, since all the Government need do, even
if it be the plaintiff as in an action to foreclose its tax lien or to reduce its assessment to judgment,
to satisfy its initial burden of going forward with the evidence, is to prove the fact of the assess-
ment of the taxes against the surety. Such proof gives the government a "prima facie" case sufficient
to support a judgment in its favor. United States vs. Rindskopf, 105 U.S. 418 (1881), Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933), Wagner v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1933),
Fiori v. Rothensies, 99 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1938; Paschal v. Blieden, 127 F.2d 398, 401 (8th Cir. 1942)
'This conclusion is inherent in the wording of § 408.205 of U.S. Treas. Reg. 128, where the
Treasury states, "Every persons is an employer if he employs one or more employees." U.S. Treas.
Reg. 107, § 403.205, supplies a similar basis for reaching the same conclusion under the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act.
'The term "employee" is defined in § 1621 (c) to include officers and employees of political
and governmental bodies and to include officers of corporations. No further definition of employee is
included in the statute, but this omission would scarcely be fatal to the conclusion that the term
"employee" may include other workers as well. Except for the Latin maxim "Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius," the word "include" used in the statute would not ordinarily be taken to mean
"is limited to." U.S. Treas. Reg. 120, § § 406.203, 406.205 define "employee" and "employer" under
the Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages Act.
'Generally, in determining whether or not one is an employer under two or more of the above
statutes, the courts have drawn no distinction among the three statutes out of their differences in
wording. Southern Warehouse Corp. v. Scofield, 110 F.Supp. 553 (S.D. Tex. 1952), appeal to Court
of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit pending; William Simpson Construction Co. v. Westover, - F.2d
- (9th Cir. 1954), 54-1 USTC 49,022.
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Second, he will take heart from the fact that each regulation provides a limit-
ing pair of criteria to the basic employment relationship. For the relation.
ship to exist, an employee must be "subject to the will and control of the
employer nbt only as to what shall be done but how it shall be done."' If the
surety's officers bear this basic pair of qualifications in mind, they can readill
protect the surety when determining its proper course of conduct on default
of the principal contractor. If the principal is a responsible concern, the
surety may make arrangements to have the contractor continue in the status
of employer, while the surety makes the necessary payments, including ad-
vances to the contractor for wages and salaries. To insulate itself from liabil-
ity for employment taxes, under this situation, the surety must eschew the
personal direction of construction; i.e., what shall be done, and the personal
direction of the workers on the project; i.e., how it shall be done. Hiring and
firing of workers should also be left to the principal.9 Naturally, the em-
ployees will continue to be carried on the principal's payroll,'0 and the prin-
cipal will continue to file the returns of the employment taxes."
If the surety follows this proceduie, it is not likely to be found liable
as an employer under these tests for any deficiencies in employment taxes
during the period that it is contributing funds for wage payments. The mere
fact it furnishes the necessary funds is not alone sufficient to create the status
of common law employer. Conversely, if the surety insists upon "taking
over"--upon managing the project, upon hiring and firing workers, upon
day to day control of their tasks-it will undoubtedly have displaced the
principal contractor as the employer and have assumed the primary liability
of the employer for these taxes."
The course of procedure outlined above has been tested by litigation.
The question for the court's determination, whether or not the surety is liable
as an employer, is one of fact, making it difficult for one to draw certair
conclusions as to the type of activity that will ensnare the surety in tax re
'U.S. Treas. Reg. 128, § 408.204 (F.I.C.A.); U.S. Treas. Reg. 107, § 403.204 (F.U.T.), U.S.
Treas. Reg. 120, § 406.203.
'An "important factor indicating that the person possessing that right is an employer," under
the above regulations.
"
0In cases of doubt between two possible employers, this factor may control as under LT. 3657,
1944 Ctum.BuLL 454.
'2,, ...which reflected that the employees were his own and that the taxes which should have
been withheld from their wages constituted his obligation.' Southern Warehouse Corp. v. Scofield,
supra note 7.
' 
2S.S.T. 314, 1938-2 Cutr.BuiL. 302, an interpretation under the predecessors to the current
statutes, Titles VHI (F.I.C.A.) and IX (F.U.T.) of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 636,
539, may give point to this statement. There, on default under a mortgage, a bank, as holder of a
mortgage, took possession of the debtor's property, managed it through an agent who hired, con-
trolled and discharged employees, and paid wages out of income from the property. For the purpose
of Titles VIII and IX, the bank had become the employer and was required to pay social security
taxes. The fact that the debtor continued to pay the wages (since the income of the property in
excess of that required for the payment of the mortgage was accountable to him) was unmiaterial,
since control of the property and the employees was no longer in his hanxds.
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sponsibility. However, certain of these fact situations tested by the courts
may be reviewed with profit; any danger areas developed by these cases will
be of concern to the surety in deciding upon its future conduct.
The first case to be explored, Southern Warehouse Corp. v Scofield, 3
dealt with the effect of advances made to the principal contractor which were
earmarked for wage payments. From the time that the contractor became un-
able to pay his obligations, the owner for whom the building was being built
made good by advancing payments to the contractor ahead of the progress
payment schedule. Some of the advances were made directly to a fund out of
which only wages were drawn; during a few weeks of this arrangement, the
owner's checks were in an amount exactly equal to the total of the week's net
payroll. A trusted third party drew and signed the individual payroll checks,
but whenever an employee quit, the owner paid him directly. The contractor
continued to supervise the job and to direct the employees; he also kept the
right to hire and to fire. Quarterly returns of employment taxes were made
out by the contractor showing taxes due, but no check accompanied the re-
turns when filed. After assessment of the unpaid balances against it, the
owner paid the tax and sued for refund.
The court invalidated the government's assessment, holding that the
owner was not the employer. The only factors that the government could point
to, namely, that advances had been earmarked for wages, were insufficient
in the court's mind to change the owner into an employer; these payments,
the court reasoned, were made by the owner simply to protect his own inter-
ests as owner of the premises. The fact of earmarking was likewise of no
significance to the court, since it was merely a security device to protect the
owner from possible misapplications of the fund by the contractor.
A further refinement of this situation was presented in Westover v
William Simpson Constructzon Co.4 Here, however, the claimed employer
had made a subsequent contract with his defaulting subcontractor to pay the
"Citation supra note 7. This case arises out of the claimed liability of the owner of the premises
who had contracted with a general building contractor on a progress payment basis to have a plant
built. Although this is not a suretyship case, this fact does not impair the value of the decision as
a precedent on the surety question. The theories of liability are the same: by making advances and
by otherwise participating in the contractor's work, the owner, or surety, had become the employer
of the contractor's workers for the purpose of employment taxes. If there be any distinction between
these two situations, it would be one that works in favor of the surety; obviously, it is easier to hold
an owner, upon whose premises the men are working and for whose benefit the work is being done,
to be an employer of those men than to hold a surety, whose only relationship to the project is one
of contract, to be the employer. Therefore owner victories on this question may be taken at full
value by the surety whereas government triumphs over the owner may be explained away in part by
the surety on the above grounds.
"4Citation supra note 7. This time it was a prime contractor who got into difficulties making
good for his subcontractor. The basic relationship of the prime contractor to the job is one of con-
tract, as is the surety's. Since both a prime contractor and a surety would take action to protect
their own interests in a case of default by another, the value of this case as precedent would seem
to be undiminished when applied to a surety situation.
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net amount of wages, after withheld tax liability was computed and sub.
tracted, into a fund to be used to pay wages due the employees of the sub.
contractor. The payments into the fund were again treated as advances to
the subcontractor, although the latter did not make out the payroll checks.
An office manager of the claimed employer, here the prime contractor on the
job, drew and signed the checks. The subcontractor continued to hire and
fire workers and to direct their work on his part of the job.
After assessment and collection of the employment taxes from the
prime contractor, the latter sued for refund,'" claiming that its actions had
not created an employment relationship between itself and its subcontractor's
employees. The court found that the prime contractor had not become the
employer under the above relationship. Detailed control of the wage pay-
ments, including complete identification of their source, was not held con-
trolling. Again the court pointed to the self-interest of the prime contractor
in making the advances to insure the work was completed and in controlling
payments to secure the advances against misapplication. Thus, it seems fair
to conclude that advances of wage payments 6 in themselves are not sufficient
to clothe the surety with garments of an employer in the absence of other
indicia of employment relating to the tests of what shall be done and how it
shall be done. Just as in these cases, the surety's action in advancing moneys
to pay wages is prompted by its desire to protect its own interests, not by a
desire to become the employer. In order for a surety, then, to be held respon-
sible for employment taxes, it must meet other requirements of common law
employment in addition to paying the employee's wages.
(2) The Joint Venture Test.
For the purposes of the employment tax acts, an employer is defined
as the "person" for whom services are rendered by individuals as em-
"In these cases involving employment taxes, the clanned employer normally has but one
remedy by wlch he may question the Commissioner's determination that he is liable for the taxes,
namely, by way of suit for refund after he has paid the zinount owing. The remedy of petition to
the Tax Court prior to payment is not available to test the validity of an employment tax deficiency
or assessment. (§ 1101, I.R.C.) In view of the requirement that no suit for refund may be com-
menced until more than six months after payment of the taxes has been made (§ 3772, I.R.C.), the
hardship of this procedure upon a business of limited financial resources is apparent. In recognition
of this situation, the Bureau reorganization of 1952 provides additional safeguards to prevent arbi-
trary assessment of employment taxes by amending its administrative procedure to provide for a
conference and review of the investigating officer's findings. See paragraphs 7, 8, and 15 of the
Commissioner's Reorganization Order No. 2 (Revised) of July 1, 1953, 5 CCH FED. TAx REP. 1953,
1 8065.
In a case of unsual hardship resulting from the proposed collection of an assessment, a tax-
payer may sue in District Court to enjoin collection; the granting of a perpetual injunction will,
for all practical purposes, be the equivalent of a judgment on the merits. See the decisions collected
under § 3653, I.R.C.
"A fortiori, advances of expenditures other than wages would not implicate the surety in this
situation. American Fidelity Co. v. Delaney, 114 F.Supp. 702 (D. Vt. 1935), appeal to Court of
Appeals for First Circuit pending.
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ployees."7 The term "person" is in turn defined to include the recognized
business entities of sole proprietorship, partnerships and corporations."
In the case of a corporation or of an individual, the fixing of the employment
tax liability depends solely upon analyzing the arrangement entered into
between the business entity and the person rendering services. If an employer-
employee relationship is found to exist, the corporation or individual doing
business as a sole proprietorship is liable, as a business entity, for employ-
ment taxes.
Basically, the same is true for a partnership. Again, the tests for deter-
mining whether or not an employment relationship has been established
between the partnership and those hired are the same; if the partnership is
found to be an employer, it will be liable for employment taxes." However,
unlike other types of business entity,2" the fastening of tax liability upon the
partnership does not end the government's quest for possible tax debtors.
Since, under local law, each of the partners is individually liable for the
debts of the partnership, the government may enforce its claim for partner-
ship taxes against each partner. Hence, although it may be the partnership
that is the "employer," and thereby the "person" incurring employment tax
liability, each of the partners, because of his interest in the partnership, may
be required to pay the taxes out of his individual assets.
In normal partnership arrangements this problem is not acute; the
claim of tax liability is fought solely on the question of whether or not
an employment relationship existed. But in the peripheral cases in which the
government alleges a partnership, the question of the existence of the part-
nership may become fully as important as a finding on the employment ques-
tion. In seeking to recover an asserted employment tax liability against one
claimed to be a partner, the government may be defeated on either of two
17§§ 1426(b) [F.I.C.A.], 1607(b), (c) [F.U.T.], and 1621(d) [WHI I.R.C.
8 §§ 1426(f), 1607(k), 3797(a) (1) I.R.C.
"VU.S. Treas. Reg. 107, §§403.201(j), 403.301 [F.U.T.], U.S. Treas. Reg. 128, §408.201(i)
[F.I.C.A.], and U.S. Treas. Reg. 116, § 405.107 [WH], see Adler v. Nicholas, 166 F.2d 674 (10th
Cir. 1948) The latter case dealt with the liability of a partnership for federal excise taxes. Since
the excises had arisen out of sales by the partnership, the United States could reach partnership
assets as a partnership creditor to satisfy the tax liability. This holding should be contrasted to the
result reached when the tax liability is that of the individual partners, as, for instance, federal
income tax liability under § 181 I.R.C. Where income taxes are concerned, the government cannot
levy upon partnership assets directly, but must content itself with reaching the individual partner's
interest in the partnership; the practical result is, of course, to subordinate individual tax claims
to the claims of partnership creditors as to partnership assets. I.T. 3356, 1940-1 Cus. BULL. 72. See
United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408 (1925), Commissioner v. Whitiey, 169 F.2d 562 (2d Cir.
1948), cert. dented, 335 U.S. 892; Adler v. Nicholas, supra, insofar as the case relates to the
partners' income taxes; Scherf v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 810; A. H. Graves, 12 B.T.A. 124 (1928) non acq. VII-2 Cuwi. BULL.. 47.
'The sole reason for this footnote is to call attention to penalty assessments under § 2707 I.R.C.
as to corporate officers who have control over the payment of employment taxes. The administrative
provisions of Chapter 25, which includes § 2707, of the code, are applicable to the Federal Insur-
ance Contributions Act (§ 1430 thereof), to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (§ 1610 thereof),
and to withholding taxes (§ 1627 thereof)
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grounds: (1) that the partnership itself was not an employer, or (2) that
the claimed taxpayer was not a partner. Of course, the latter defense is avail-
able only to an alleged partner who did not personally act as the employer;
the defense arises only where his liability is one derived from the alleged
partnership.
The importance of this question to a surety becomes apparent when
reference is made to the concept of "partnership" under the Internal Revenue
Code. When the word "partnership" is used in the code, section 3797(a) (2)
provides that it:
"includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated
association, through or by means of which any business, financial operation,
or venture is carried on, and which is not . . . a trust or estate or a
corporation . . "
The difficulty arises out of the term "joint venture." The concept of
"joint venture" is broad and ill-defined; normally it is taken to cover the
association of two or more persons for a limited time to carry out for profit
a specific business enterprise they have in mind. 1 The concept is broader
than that embraced by the term "partnership" in certain respects but narrower
in others. For instance, the relationship between the parties may be more
informal than in the case of a partnership; on the other hand, a joint venture
is often limited to a specific enterprise or transaction, in contrast to a partner-
ship which may engage in a general business to be continued over many
years.22
In any event, it is difficult to predict whether or not a business arrange-
ment is a joint venture, and thereby a "partnership" under the code, even
though serious tax consequences may flow out of a determination of this
question.2' For this reason, a surety which enters into an arrangement with
a defaulting contractor to ensure completing a certain construction job must
take care to fortify its position against a later claim that the arrangement
constituted a "joint venture."
In William Simpson Construction Co. v. Westover,24 the collector made
precisely this contention. The original relationship between the plaintiff and
the employer was one of prime-subcontractor. However, once the subcontrac-
2130 Am. Jun., Joint Adventures § 3 (1940).
2Id. § 5.
"See, for example, First Mechanics Bank of Trenton v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.
1937), Harland Bartholomew, 9 T.C.M. 302 (1950) (holding that an associate was not a "partner"),
reversed as Bartholomew v. Commssioner, 186 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1951) (for lack of a specific
finding as to a joint venture), on remand as Harland Bartholomew, 10 T.C.M. 957 (1951) (finding
the associate to he a Joint venturer), Harry Klein, 18 T.C. 804 (1952) acq. 1953 Imr. REV. BULL.
No. 11 at 1.
"100 F.Supp. 125 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd. sub nom. Westover v. William Simpson Construction
Co., - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1954), 54-1 USTC 49,022. The material facts are set out in the
discussion pertaining to footnote 14 suprm.
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tor was in default, the prime contractor, in order to protect itself, stepped
outside the terms of the subcontract by entering into the following arrange-
ment: (1) the prime contractor agreed to pay the net amount of wages due
to the subcontractor's employees until the job was completed; (2) to meet
payrolls accruing after this agreement, the prime contractor advanced part of
the final subcontract price to the subcontractor in amounts sufficient to pay
net wages; (3) the prime contractor's office manager was empowered to draw
the payroll checks, according to the subcontractor's records, for payment
to the subcontractor's employees.
Under all these circumstances, the court held that "(a)ssistance in fi-
nancing does not of necessity turn the arrangement into a joint venture.25
In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed out, first, that the arrangement
for advances was not unusual in the construction trade, and, second, that the
prime contractor had relied upon the subcontractor's representation that it
would meet its obligations at the end of the quarter when the employment
taxes became due. Only the first of these reasons bears analysis."6 Since the
relationship was not uncommon, payment of the contract price to a contractor
would not tend to establish a joint venture; it would be merely the discharge
of an existing debtor-creditor relationship as in other similar situations.
Apart from the peculiarities of the construction trade, it would seem proper
for any prospective debtor to make advances to his creditor without being
held liable as a participant in his creditor's business. But, similarly, danger
to a debtor in making advances does lurk in any steps taken by him to control
the expenditures of these advances. To the extent that the future debtor
participates in his creditor's business affairs, where a joint profit objective
is present, he runs an increasing risk of assuming responsibility as a pro-
prietor. For this reason, the court, in the William Simpson Construction Co.
case, carefully pointed out that the duties of the prime contractor's office
manager were ministerial in nature; once the subcontractor had certified
over the payroll, the office manager was powerless to withhold payment to the
workers. For this reason, the court was able to view the intervention of the
prime contractor's office manager as a convenience and service to the sub-
contractor, not as a means of exercising control over the subcontractor's
operations.
The moral for the surety under similar circumstances is clear. Any
arrangement for paying laborers of a defaulting principal ought (1) to be
treated as advances upon its ultimate obligation to the owner to make good
2
'Id. at 127.
"iAny representation by the subcontractor which induced the prime contractor into entering
a joint venture relationship would be immaterial as far as the rights of the government are con-
cerned; the only effect such a representation could have would be between the joint venturers, z.e.,
to give the prime contractor a right of action against the subcontractor if the representation were
false.
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unpaid wages, and (2) to be handled, for purposes of drawing checks, of
ensuring proper disposition of the advances and of keeping payroll records,
through an independent intermediary. For the surety to handle these matters
directly or through its own employees is to increase the risk of personal
liability as a joint venturer for the unpaid employment taxes of its principal.
(3) The Control Over Wages Test.
The effect of control over the payment of wages to the defaulting con-
tractor's employees has been dealt with in the analysis of the common law
tests above. There it was concluded that the courts are reluctant to posit
employment tax liability against the surety if its only relationship to the
employees is through its power to require that its advances to the contractor
be used to pay wages.
This conclusion, correct as it may be under the common law tests of
employment, must be modified in part to reflect a special statutory provision
governing liability for withheld income taxes. That provision, section
1621(d) (1), Internal Revenue Code, is written as an exception to the general
rules for deciding who is the employer and reads as follows:
"The term 'employer' means the person for whom an individual per-
forms or performed any service, of whatever nature, as the employee of such
person, except that-
"(1) if the person for whom the individual performs or performed the
services does not have control of the payment of the wages for such services,
the term 'employer' (. . . )27 means the person having control of the pay-
ment of such wages . . ."
This subsection is not written into either the Federal Insurance Contri-
butions Act or the Federal Unemployment Tax Act; hence, it may fairly
be concluded that the surety's problem of control under this exception is
limited to withheld income taxes.28
"'The omitted portion of the subsection is a parenthetical clause reading as follows: "except for
the purposes of subsection (a) " The reason for this exception to the exception quickly appears
upon a glance at subsection (a) That subsection contains the statutory definition of "wages,"
which is taken to mean any remuneration paid for services rendered to an employer. Since subsec-
tion (d) adds to the class of employers one other than the person for whom the services were per-formed, the "wages" definition would be ludicrous if subsection (d) were not qualified as it is. It
would mean that "wages" is remuneration for services rendered to an employer who is not the
employer for whom the services are performed.
"See United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947), Westover v. William Simpson Con-
struction Co., supra note 7. However, as a matter of correct statutory interpretation, this would seem
to be the proper conclusion since § 1621 entitled "Definitions" begins with the qualifying phrase,
"As used in this subchapter (Subchapter D which includes only withholding of income taxes)."
But note the confusing language of Judge Yankwich in United States v. Swedlow Engineering Co.,
100 F.Supp. 796, 797 (S.D. Cal. 1951), rev'd sub nom. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. UnitedStates, -F.2d - (9th Cir. 1954), 54-1 USTC 5 49,026. There, after reciting the fact that the
defaulting contractor owed withheld income, F.I.C. and F.U.T. taxes, the opinion cites § 1621 (d)(I) for its view that " ..under this arrangement, the bonding company had 'control of the pay-
ment of the wages'." Confusion arises since the decision was favorable to the government on all
three taxes, without reference to the exceptional status of income taxes under § 1621(d) (1) Other
19541
What degree of "control" is necessary in order that a non-common-law-
employer be liable for withheld taxes under this exception? The decided
cases on this question are helpful. In United States v. Swedlow Engineering
Co.,2" the government sued a surety to recover liability for withheld taxes
that had accrued on wages and salaries of the employees of a defaulting
contractor paid by its surety. After the contractor had run out of money, the
surety agreed to meet the contractor's payroll under the following arrange-
ment: the contractor drew payroll checks and sent them to the surety, which
forwarded its draft for the payroll total to the contractor's bank, together
with the payroll checks and instructions that the draft be used to cover these
checks. Under this arrangement, the district court was of the view that the
surety had "control of the payment of the wages" under section 1621 (d) (1)
Clearly, under these circumstances the surety would appear to have
control over wage payments; wages could not be paid unless the surety, as
each payroll was received by it, decided to put funds into the bank and to
forward the payroll checks for payment to the wage earners. But even under
these circumstances it must be admitted that the surety's control is not ex-
clusive; the contractor who makes up the payroll and who draws the payroll
checks also has a degree of control. The payment of wages requires that a
joint effort be made by the surety and the defaulting contractor.
Ought joint control be sufficient to predicate liability upon? The point
was not faced by the district court in the Swedlow Engineering Co. case, supra,
and the statute gives only a partial answer. As previously mentioned, section
1621(d) is phrased as an exception to the general employment situation. To
paraphrase its language, one could read the statute as follows:
"Only when the common law employer 'does not have control of the
payment of wages' will 'the person having control of the payment of such
wages' be considered the employer." If the word "control" means the same
thing in both the premise and the conclusion of the statutory exception, then
the word must be used in its exclusive sense. Joint control between the
surety and the employer would not suffice, since the employer would have a
degree of control that would prevent the statutory exception from coming
into play. However, the government could argue that "control" as used in
the first part of the sentence means "exclusive control" and in the latter part
"joint control."
grounds of liability were present, however; consequently, it is difficult to point to this decision as
being precedent on the question of whether a § 1621 (d) (1) employer is an "employer" under all
employment taxes or merely under withheld income taxes. See, also, Southern Warehouse Corp. v.
Scofield, supra note 7, where apparently the government contended all three taxes came undei
§ 1621(d) (1)
"Citation supra note 28. The reversal of this decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit was per curwam on the basis of its prior decision in the William Simpson Construction Co.
case, supra note 7, the latter decision made no reference to a joint venture.
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Legislative history sheds little light upon this problem. The only illus-
tration given in the pre-enactment materials to section 1621(d) (1) is one
involving exclusive control-the liability of a fiduciary of a pension trust
paying pensions to retired employees.a"
Apparently, however, the commissioner's regulations interpret the
statutory concept of "control" to be exclusive. He has provided, in explana-
tion of section 1621(d) (1), that:
"If the person for whom the services are or were performed does not
have legal control of the payment of the wages for such services, the term
'employer' means . . . the person having such control . (Emphasis
added.)
Since the commissioner has used the word "such" in the latter part of
the sentence, the word "control" must be used in an exclusive sense. To take
the term to mean "partial control" would be nonsense, for necessarily the
partial control of the surety would be different from the partial control of
the employer. The additional qualification expressed in the above regulation
that the control be "legal" would not alter this result, except insofar as it
places emphasis upon the rights and liabilities of the parties rather than
upon the mechanical facts of preparing and transmitting the payroll and
payroll checks."2 In both areas, the surety would be wise to share respon-
sibility with the employer.
The conclusion in the William Simpson Construction case s supports
this analysis. There the court stated the test of the section 1621(d) (1) ex-
ception as follows:
"To render the exception applicable two things must be shown: (1) that
United (the defaulting subcontractor) had no control over the payment of
wages, and (2) that Simpson-Kier (the making-good principal contractor)
had. Obviously the requirement was not met. Whatever measure of control
Simpson-Kier might have had it was not exclusive, but was shared with
United."
Hence, despite this exception in the statute, Simpson-Kier was not found
to be the employer of the workers paid with its funds.
A result consistent with this analysis was reached in Southern Ware-
house Corporation v. Scofield,34 but without discussion of the point. Joint
aoSee the reports of Congressional Committees on H.R. 2570, The Current Tax Payment Act of
1943, namely, H.R.REP. No. 401, 1943 Cum. BULL. 1283 at 1288, SEN. REP. No. 221, 1943 Cum.
BuLL. 1314 at 1317 and at 1329, and H.R.REP. No. 510, 1943 Cum. BULL. 1351 at 1353, all of the
78th Congress, First Session.
"
1U.S. Treas. Reg. 120, § 406.205(c).
"iSee, however, the emphasis placed by the comnssioner on the mechancs of the transfer o1
employees from the payroll of the employer to the payroll of Ins lessee in I.T. 3657, 1944 Cuss.
BULL. 454. The appearance of the employee on the payroll of the lessee was used as the controlling
factor in determimng whether the lessee was responsible for withholding.
"'Citation supra note 7.
"Citation supra note 7.
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control over payment of wages had been arranged between the defaulting
contractor and the owner 5 for whom the building was being constructed. The
owner agreed to make advances to the contractor to be deposited in a special
account; checks, including payroll, could be drawn on this account only upon
the signatures of the contractor and of the owner's regularly employed
auditor. In a few cases this arrangement was departed from, the owner
made direct payment to the contractor's employees at the time of their firing
or quitting. These circumstances, which fairly show joint control over wages,
did not obligate the owner for withheld tax liability on the contractor's payroll
under section 1621 (d) (1). The court's findings were not, however, made in
terms of joint control;6 rather, the court found that the owner did not have
"control" over wages but merely had made advances of the contractor's
payments. Hence the owner was not the employer under the statute. By
implication, then, joint control would be insufficient to predicate section
1621(d) (1) upon.
What of wages accrued but unpaid at the time the surety assumes con-
trol? For the purposes of section 1621(d) (1), the time during which the
work was performed is immaterial; if the surety controls payments, it will be
liable as the employer." In other words, "back pay" is wages, and control
over its payment will establish employment tax liability. Conversely, the
surety will not be liable under section 1621(d) (1) for past wages paid by
the employer, even though it assumes control over current wages."8 If any
liability is found in this latter situation, it will be upon another theory than
the one discussed in this part.
A further refinement of the "control" concept was enunciated by the
court in William Simpson Construction Co. v. Westover, supra. In conclusion
to its analysis of this problem, the court stated:
"The fact that the plaintiffs were the source of funds does not bring them
within the meaning of Section 1621(d) (1) ,,39
This conclusion is borne out by the cases discussed above. In each of
them the surety, or other comparable party, was not liable merely because
it was bailing out the defaulting contractor by advancing payroll moneys.
The control required for the application of section 1621(d) (1) must extend
"The applicability of decisions involving owner-contractor and prime contractor-subcontractof
relationships to the surety-contractor situation has been analyzed above, notes 13 and 14.8 Interestingly, however, the only case cited in the district court's opinion is William Simpson
Construction Co. v. Westover, discussed above.
"Note the language of § 1621 (d) (1), "if the person for whom the person performs or per-
formed the services . " (Emphasis added.), United States v. Fogarty, supra note 28; In re
Paul Daigle, 111 F.Supp. 109 (D. Me. 1935)
sGeneral Casualty Co. of America v. United States, 205 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1953) In its opinion
the court carefully noted that the surety "saw to the payment of all taxes withheld from salaries
and wages after Smith's [the contractor's] default." Id. at 755.
"William Simpson Construction Co. v. Westover, supra note 24 at 127.
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beyond the right to decide whether or not moneys should be advanced; how
much further it must extend is a fact question which can readily be eliminated
by proper planning at the time the surety is called into the picture to "make
good."
B. The Surety as Payor.
Suppose the surety, instead of advancing funds for claims, pays the
employees directly? This fact alone, in the absence of other indicia of
employment, would not turn the surety into an employer under the common
law tests. It would, however, subject the surety to liability under section
1621(d) (1) for withheld income taxes under the control over wages test,
discussed above. What then of the other two employment taxes?
In neither the Federal Insurance Contributions Act nor in the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act is there written a "control" provision similar to
section 1621(d) (1).4 Hence, a defense for the surety springs readily to
mind if the government threatens an assessment against it under these cir-
cumstances. Since the control over wages test is not included in the latter two
employment tax acts, it logically follows that payment of wages without
more cannot create liability for these taxes.
But, before this conclusion can validly be reached, we must dispose
of an adverse line of cases arising out of bankruptcy. The first of these is
United States v. Fogarty,4 a decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in 1947. There Fogarty, as trustee in bankruptcy, had taken over a business,
and after attempting to put it back on its feet, had commenced liquidating it.
Among the creditors' claims paid by him as trustee were several to former
employees for wages earned by them for services rendered to the bankrupt
company. On this showing, the government assessed F.I.C.A. and F.U.T.
taxes against the trusteeY.4 The trustee challenged the assessment, asserting
that he was not the "employer" of these men, as they had not performed
services for him. The court on appeal, however, did not follow this analysis.
Rather than finding whether or not the trustee was an "employer" under these
statutes, the court turned to the concept of wages to justify its conclusion that:
" ...the taxing provisions are concerned with the character oj the
payments as wages rather than with the relationship of the payor to the
payee ....- 3 (Emphasis added.)
Following his chain of thought, the court concluded that the term "em-
ployer" meant not only "present employer" but also "former employer," as
"See discussion at note 28 supra.
"'Citation supra note 28.
"Tax liability for withheld income taxes was also assessed, but the court's decision on this tax
was based upon § 1621 (d) (1) of the Code, discussed above.
"United States v. Fogarty supra note 28 at 30.
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indicated by the regulations,44 and under the facts of this case, "substituted
employer." A trustee who pays a claim for services rendered to his predeces-
sor is therefore liable for employment taxes upon this payment." Nor does
this decision stand alone. Questionable as its reasoning may be, other courts
in bankruptcy have adopted its conclusions without visible dissent.4"
The danger of this line of reasoning to the surety is clear. Although no
decision has been found which applies this analysis to a surety paying
wages,47 the risk of such application is always present. Perhaps these cases
may be distinguished on the ground that a trustee in bankruptcy is in fact a
successor employer at the time he pays these claims. He represents the same
business to which the employee rendered his services. Consequently, it would
not be remiss for a court to hold the trustee as employer under the common
law theories of employment." If this be so, the surety has a valid defense:
only if the surety completely took over the job from the contractor could it
be considered a successor employer to the contractor. Mere payment of the
contractor's wage claims would not suffice.
In the absence of a definitive precedent on this question, however, it
would be wise for a surety to make arrangements other than direct payment
for satisfying outstanding wage claims. Although payment alone may be a
slender reed for the government to lean upon, the difficulties of fighting and
of prevailing over an assessment ought to be sufficient to deter any surety
from risking the possibility.
C. The Surety as Surety.
Even if the surety maneuvers around the government's outposts in the
field of employer's liability, it still faces additional batteries supporting the
government's position. These armaments are not exclusive in nature; rather
they are cumulative and supplementary. Consequently, the surety must
"Former Reg. 106, § 402.227. See also Social Security Board v. Nierotho, 327 U.S. 358 (1946)
dealing with an employee wrongfully discharged who was ordered reinstated with back pay. The
reluctant employer was charged with employment tax liability on the back pay, which covered the
employee's period of discharge.
"Nor can it be argued that this liability is merely derivative--just a tax claim to be allowed
and paid as if it were any other claim against the bankrupt's estate. The court pointed out that
these taxes should be classified as an expense of administration, i.e., an expense incurred by the
trustee, and hence should be paid first.
"United States v. Curtis, 178 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1949) cert. denied 339 U.S. 965, and In re
Paul Daigle, supra note 37.
"See, however, United States v. Swedlow Engineering Co., supra note 28, which mentioned the
Fogarty decision indiscriminately with other authorities. In Westover v. William Simpson Construc.
tion Co., supra note 7, this analysis was expressly rejected on the basis of prior law.
"This was the analysis of the referee in In re Amoskeag, 34 AM. B.R. (N.S.) 469 (D.Mass.
1937). The trustee was liable for these taxes not because he paid wage claims but because he repre-
sented the successor to the very business entity which had employed the claimants.
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face and defeat each theory separately and its possible responsibility for
employment taxes must be measured against all of them."9
(1) Covenants in the Suretyship Bond.
Generally, the surety's bond for labor and materials in favor of the
owner on a construction job contains an agreement to pay or to satisfy all
claims for labor that may arise out of the performance of the construction
contract. Ordinarily the surety's liability to the owner does not accrue until
the contractor is in default; but once default has occurred, the surety'is liable
to pay wages both to protect the property against mechanics' liens and, if the
bond is so conditioned, to ensure that the project is completed.
Since the government is often caught with unpaid employment tax war-
rants against the contractor in this situation, it has, in its quest for a solvent
taxpayer, asserted that employment taxes are "claims for the payment of
labor" and that consequently the surety is liable for their payment just as it
is liable for paying wages to the workers. To be successful in its contention,
the government must show not only that employment taxes are embraced
within the concept of "claims for the payment of labor" but also that the tax
collector is a third party beneficiary under the bond possessing the power to
enforce its obligations against the surety.
The force of the government's argument under suretyship bonds has
not reached employment taxes other than those subject to withholding from
wages and salaries. Thus, the surety has not been held responsible under the
terms of its bond for its principal's unpaid federal unemployment taxes."
But in the case of employment taxes withheld from wages, the surety
runs more of a risk. Since these taxes are deducted from gross wages and
since their withholding serves to satisfy the wage obligation, the government
has logically claimed that these taxes are part of the claims for labor incurred
in performing the contract. Hence, the surety ought to be liable to the govern-
ment for these taxes just as it is liable to the employees for their net wages.
The obligation to pay wages, it is argued, extends to their full amount, not
'"Surprisingly enough, the government, despite its seeming plethora of armament, has been
signally unsuccessful in reducing the surety to the status of an employment-tax taxpayer. The box
score of decided cases, at this writing, is as follows: Surety- 6. Government: 1. If the prime con-
tractor-subcontractor and contractor-owner cases are added to this listing, the score becomes a
rout: Taxpayer: 8. Government: 1.
r'This result was reached even under a Miller Act performance bond where the principal had
obligated itself to pay "any and all contributions or taxes for Unemployment Insurance." United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1953), reversing an un-
reported district court decision. Apparently the lower court had taken the position that the inclusion
of a promise to pay taxes in the contract made the tax liability a contractual obligation for which
the surety stood as guarantor. However, the Court of Appeals, in reversing, held that the promise
did not create the liability; since the contractor was liable for unemployment taxes as the employer,
its promise to pay these taxes was "merely declaratory of Kendnck's [the contractor's] existing
liability under the federal tax laws." Nor would the surety be responsible for the contractor's cor-
porate income taxes. American Fidelity Co. v. Delaney, supra note 16.
1954]
merely to the net received in cash by the employees. The remainder, paid to
the government, goes to benefit the employees either by way of credit on their
income taxes or by way of building up their reserve for retirement.
5 1
However, the courts which have faced this argument have been, for a
variety of reasons, reluctant to read the surety's bond as the government reads
it. One of the arguments which has served to defeat the commissioner grows
out of his own regulations on withheld employment taxes. In both the federal
insurance contributions and the withheld-income tax regulations, the com-
missioner has provided, out of an understandable sense o f equity in favor of
employees involuntarily subject to withholding, that the amount withheld
for taxes from his gross wages should be credited to his account whether or
not his employer subsequently pays these taxes to the government.52 Further-
more, the Internal Revenue Code protects the employer by stating that he is
not answerable to the employee for the amount withheld.53 From these prem-
ises, the court, in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States,
54
reasoned that the contractor's act of withholding had discharged pro tanto
its liability for wages. Any obligation still owing by the contractor to the
government would be for taxes, not for labor.5 Hence, the contractor's labor
obligations had been fully satisfied and the surety could not be held re-
sponsible to the government under that part of its bond securing labor
claims.56
A further refinement of these opposing analyses is presented by the
lower court in United States v. Swedlow Engineering Co.57 There the court
found that a laborers' and materialmen's bond obligated the surety "to pay
the entire wage of each employee, including the portion earned by the em-
ployee which the employer was required to withhold.""8 But, as the court
recognized, the government's burden was not completely satisfied by this
favorable interpretation of the surety's obligation to make good unpaid wages.
The step that still remained was to determine whether or not the obligations
"
1See Pickett's dissent to United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, supra note 50
at 122; United States v. General Casualty Co. of America, (W.D. Tex., 1952) 52-2 USTC
9498, reversed, 205 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1953) ; and National Surety Corp. v. Barth, 20 N.J. Super.
100, 89 A.2d 104 (1952), affirmed on another point 11 N.J. 506, 95 A.2d 145 (1953).
5 2U.S. Treas. Reg. 120, § 406.705(b) [WHI; U.S. Treas. Reg. 128, § 408.304 [F.I.C.A.].
3§ 1401(b) [F.I.C.A.3; § 1623 [WH], I.R.C.
"Supra note 50.
"
5The acceptance of this line of reasoning is an illustration of the government being hoisted
on its own petard, for the government itself has claimed that the employer's liability to the govern-
ment to pay over withheld amounts is a tax and not some other type of liability such as a debt or a
penalty. United States v. State of New York, 315 U.S. 510 (1942).
"'To the same effect are General Casualty Co. of America v. United States, supra note 38;
United States v. Zschach Construction Co., 110 F.Supp. 551 (E.D. Okla. 1953), aff'd. (10th Cir. 1954)
54-1 USTC 9164; American Fidelity Co. v. Delaney, supra note 16; and United States v.
Seaboard Surety Co., (W.D. Wisc. 1953) 54-1 USTC 49,021. See Central Bank v. United States,
345 U.S. 639 (1953).5 Citation supra note 28.5 Id. at 798.
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of the bond ran in favor of the government as well as in favor of the labor-
ers and materialmen themselves. The Swedlow case sidestepped this issue by
finding that the government's action was not based upon the bond; rather it
was bottomed upon the surety's liability as a section 1621(d) (1) employer,
substituted for the contractor as employer under the terms of its bond and
by its actions.
This latter step seems of primary importance to any suit by the govern-
ment upon the bond. Unfortunately, the courts favorably disposed toward
the government on the first issue, i.e., whether or not withheld taxes are a
charge for labor, have not faced-up to this question. Having found that the
surety's labor obligation includes gross wages, these courts conclude without
more ado that the surety is liable for employment taxes.59 Clearly this anal-
ysis works havoc with commonly understood principles of third party bene-
ficiary contracts. Its begs the question of whether or not the government is a
direct beneficiary of the contract of suretyship entitled to enforce its terms
or is a mere incidental beneficiary given no rights thereunder. To use the
assignment analogy as settling this problem is to ignore legal realities; no
assignment was in fact given by the wage-earner to the government, nor do
the withholding statutes contemplate such assignment."' It would appear that
the proper solution of this problem lies in the rules of law governing con-
tract beneficiaries obtaining in the particular jurisdiction in which the gov-
ernment is attempting to enforce the suretyship contract.6"
Apart from the assignment analogy, little precedent can be found on
this problem. However, in Westover v. William Simpson Construction Co.,
the court may have been referring to this problem when it stated:
"The purpose of this bond [a payment bond filed under the Miller Act]
was to protect laborers and materialmen. It was not intended, as counsel for
ssSee, for example, National Surety Corp. v. Barth, supra note 51; and United States v. General
Casualty Co. of America, supra note 51. In his dissent to United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
United States, supra note 50 at 122, Judge Pickett adverted to this problem, concluding that the
government could hold the surety responsible. His conclusion rested upon cases involving wage
assignments: since the surety would be liable to a wage earner's assignee, it would also be liable
to the government, which has, in effect, taken an assignment of the wages withheld.
"°See Judge Pickett's analysis referred to in footnote 59 supra.
"
1This factor was the burden of the government's successful argument in United States v. State
of New York, supra note 55. Further support for this statement is found in the principle that the
employer is liable to the government for withheld taxes "whether or not it is collected from the
employee." U.S. Treas. Reg. 120, § 406.401() [WHI; U.S. Treas. Ref. 128, § 408.304 [F.I.C.A.l.
The former regulation goes on to provide that if the employer fails to withhold § 1622 taxes [WHI,
but the employee himself pays his income tax against which the § 1622 tax would have been
credited had it been paid, the employer's liability for withholding taxes is discharged, except for
penalties and interest that have accrued during the period of non-payment. See Kellems v. United
States, 97 F.Supp. 681 (D.Conn. 1951).
"For a discussion of similar problems arising out of suretyship contracts, see Corbin, Third
Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds, 38 YALE L. J. 1 (1928) SELECTED READINGS ON
CONTRACTs, 667 (1931).
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the Collector argue, to assure payment of withholding or payroll taxes ...
[cit. omit.] . . . To hold that it is usable as a weapon in the collection of
taxes would be an arbitrary perversion of the legislative purpose." 63
In jurisdictions in which the test of a direct beneficiary is based upon
the intention of the contracting parties,64 this view of the government's status
would bar recovery under the suretyship bond.
(2) Enforcing the Suretyship Bond.
Even assuming that the government is able to by-pass these substantive
hurdles in its path toward recovery upon the surety's bond, there remain
further difficulties that must be overcome. Naturally, if the Director insists
that his right to collect rests upon the terms of the bond, rather than upon
the employer's statutory liability for taxes, he will have to meet the conditions
and limitations imposed by the bond upon those who seek to collect upon it.
For instance, the bond may be conditioned upon giving notice of default
within a short period, say ninety days, after default. Due to administrative
difficulties the Director rarely is able to make demand of the surety6" for
the payment of employer's taxes within ninety days after the end of the
quarter. If he fails to make timely demand, is the government barred from
recovery under the bond? Or, because it is the government that is suing, are
these limitations of no effect?
Although generally state statutes of limitations and other similar condi-
tions are no bar to a suit by the United States to enforce a federal liability,66
under the particular circumstances outlined above it seems clear that these
limitations and conditions must necessarily be met by even the government.67
After all, its suit is one based upon private contract, i.e., the surety's bond;
any conditions contained therein would not be in the nature of limitations
imposed by local law on the rights of the United States, which are proscribed,
but would be conditions precedent to the creation of the accrual of the gov-
"
3Westover v. William Simpson Construction Co., supra note 7.
"GRISMORE, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 234 (1947).
"
5Although it is customary for a delinquent quarter's employment taxes to be assessed almost
immediately upon filing of a return without payment, the Director is handicapped in his endeavor
to proceed against the surety since his customary practice is first to exhaust all of his remedies
against the contractor-employer. It is a rare case where the Director knows that his remedies vis-a-vis
the contractor are worthless and it is even rarer that he knows of the existence and the terms of a
suretyship contract. Perhaps these matters could be ironed out by properly educating his field
agents, but in view of the precedents heretofore cited, he probably sees little value in making any
extensive effort to ensure that a possible cause of action against the surety be perfected.
"
5United States v. Summerlin. 310 U.S. 414 (1939).
"
7Thus, in General Casualty Co. of America v. United States, supra note 59, 205 F.2d at 755,
the government was denied any right to recover on the surety's bond, since it had not filed an
itemized sworn statement with the proper official designated by Texas law. Similarly, in American
Fidelity Co. v. Delaney, supra note 16, 114 F.2d at 711, the court held that the conditions precedent
of Vermont law bound the United States. And see United States v. Swedlow, supra note 57, 100
F.Supp. 797, where the court sidestepped the issue of the California six months limitations on filing
claims against the surety by finding that the suit was not on the bond; since it was one brought to
recover a tax, only federal limitations could apply.
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ernment's cause of action. Since it is the contract itself which creates the li-
ability, its terms must control any suit brought to enforce it."8
Similarly, if the suit is brought by the federal government on a labor
and materialmen's bond written to meet the requirements of a federal
statute, the terms and conditions of liability under that statute must be satis-
fied before suit can be maintained.69
A final point must be made concerning the possibility of equitable re-
coupment; since these controversies customarily reach the courts through
suits for refund, the government having collected the tax by summary
administrative procedure, it has been contended that these requirements of
form and of timing imposed by local law ought not to be used to compel the
government to repay moneys that are rightfully its. The short answer to this
contention was made in William Simpson Construction Co. v. Westover.7
The talk of equitable recoupment assumes that the surety is liable; but unless
the government has given proper and timely notice, the surety is not liable.
Therefore, even in equity and good conscience, the moneys collected ought
to be refunded, barring defenses other than this one.
D. The Surety as a Preferred Creditor.
This is the tax collector's last chance. Merely because he has been un-
successful in skewering the surety on the employment point or on the bond
point, the Director need not concede his defeat. He still may achieve victory
by serving a notice of levy 7 upon the owner for any balance of the contract
price still owing to the contractor of the job." If this levy is successful, the
payment to the government is ordinarily at the expense of the surety. Nor-
mally, there is not enough of the balance of the contract price to go around,
nor are other assets of the contractor available to pay these claims. Since the
surety has already paid out funds to ensure that the job be completed (or that
liens be paid), its only chance of recoupment lies in collecting the balance
of the contract price. The net result is clear: if the government's claim for
"
8See the analysis made by Judge Yankwich in Adams v. Albany, 80 F.Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.
Cal. 1948) concerning the analogous problem of statutory limitations imposed upon a pre-existing
right of the government as distinguished from statutory requirements made a condition precedent
to the creation of liability. And see United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord,
233 U.S. 157 (1914) ; United States v. Smelser, 87 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1937).0
'United States v. Zschach Construction Co., supra note 56.
,:Citation supra note 24.
"See §§ 3690, 3692, 3710, I.R.C. This is an administrative step that the Director may take once
he has received an assessment of tax from the Commissioner. It is in effect a summary procedure
for liquidating the government's lien for taxes which is created under §§ 3670-3672, I.R.C.
"No question can he raised as to the right of the Director to levy upon sums of money due to
the taxpayer; the federal tax lien reaches intangibles as well as other property of the taxpayer.
§§ 3691, 3672, I.R.C.; Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945) ; Anderson, Federal
Tax Liens-Their Nature and Priority, 41 CALF. L. RE V. 241, 245-246 (1953). The only question
that can be presented is one of priority of claim.
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taxes is preferred to the surety's claim for reimbursement, the surety ends
up being out the amount of the tax claim.
How can this constructive liability on the party of the surety be avoided?
Or, to put it more directly, how can the surety assure itself priority over the
government? Both claims are basically against the contractor-the govern-
ment's for his taxes and the surety's for the cost of making good his default.
Therefore, their respective rights against the contract price balance owing
to him depend upon their relative rights against him and the steps taken by
each to enforce these rights.
To analyze the claim of the United States first, we find that it is nor-
mally reduced to a lien, pursuant to statutory procedure, by the time this
controversy arises. To the extent that its claim for taxes is not entitled to lien
status, the government will be subordinated. But the government need not
rest here. If the claim is being handled by an astute collection officer, he
will serve the owner with a notice of levy. If he does so the owner will un-
doubtedly be forced to have litigated or compromised the conflicting rights
of the government and the surety. Any payment made by the owner while
under levy is at his peril; if he pays a subordinate claim, he becomes person-
ally liable to the government for the amount paid.
The surety, on the other hand, can proceed only by contract-the con-
tract that is executed at the commencement of the owner-contractor-surety
relationship. To protect themselves under these circumstances, sureties nor-
mally require that a provision be inserted establishing a present lien upon the
assets of the contractor for any payments that the surety may later be com-
pelled to make on the contractor's behalf. Furthermore, the surety may
require a specific assignment in its favor of any retained balances under the
construction contract to cover any future reimbursement it may become
entitled to.
Under these circumstances, the conflict is clear: which party is to get
the retained percentages held by the owner? That question in turn depends
upon the answer to the query: on which date does the suretyship lien become
effective as against the government? The normal rule of priority between
competing liens of the federal government and of other creditors is first in
time, first in right.73 Therefore, if the surety's lien "arises" as of the date of
executing the suretyship contract, the surety undoubtedly will be preferred.
But if it does not arise until payments out are made to the contractor's
creditors, the government will participate to the extent of its intervening liens.
Obviously, then, the surety will seek to prove that its lien arose when the con-
tract was signed.
What arguments can the surety muster to establish this conclusion? The
"
3 United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., - U.S. - , 22 U.S.L.WEEK 4089 (1954).
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cases which reach this result are numerous and are based upon several dif-
ferent premises. The first of these is merely a conceptual restatement of the
question sought to be answered, as the following excerpt testifies:
" ...a surety who [sic] makes good under his contract of suretyship
upon default of the principal contractor under conditions as existed in this
case acquires an equitable lien against the unpaid balance in the hands of
the party in whose favor the bond runs, that such equitable lien upon pay-
ment by the surety relates back to the date of the contract and is superior
to a [later] claim of the United States . . .,.
Under the present state of authority, a decision resting solely upon an
analysis such as that illustrated above is fundamentally suspect. The concept
of "relation-back" is no magic elixir; to the contrary, any curative and
beneficient powers it may have had have recently been seriously questioned
by the Supreme Court. See, for instance, the majority opinion in United
States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank of San Diego,75 also a tax lien
controversy: "Nor can the doctrine of relation back . . . operate to destroy
the realities of the situation."
The surety's right to a prior lien rests upon more than this, however.
Once it has executed a bond, it has at that time subjected itself to possible
future liability-a contingency for the most part completely out of its control.
Hence a surety is not like an ordinary lender whose claim of priority must
rest upon the date of the loan. It is more in the nature of a creditor who
advances his credit far in advance of the black circumstances which later
compel him to "make good" his debtor's obligations. Since such a creditor
"From American Surety Co. of New York v. City of Louisville Municipal Housing Comm.,
63 F.Supp. 486, 487 (W.D. Ky. 1945) (per Miller, J.), aJ'd. sub nom. Glenn v. American Surety
Co., 160 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1947) on the basis of the same formula. Accord, United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, supra note 50, 201 F.2d at 121; In re Van Winkle, 49
F.Supp. 711, 712 (W.D.Ky. 1943) ; New York Casualty Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F.Supp. 473, 476 (N.D.Ill
1944) ; United States, ex. rel. Ivy v. Blair, (W.D. Tex. 1945) 45-2 USTC 9415; American
Fidelity Co. v. Delaney, supra note 16, 114 F.Supp. at 710. See dicta to the contrary in Seaboard
Surety Co. v. United States, 67 F.Supp. 969, 971 (Ct.CL 1946) cert. denied 330 U.S. 826.
"340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950). The decision arose out of a controversy superficially similar to the
surety-government dispute here discussed. There the government had secured tax liens on the
property of a delinquent between the dates that a private creditor had (1) attached his debtor's
property and (2) had reduced his claim and attachment to judgment so that he could execute. In
the resulting dispute, the private creditor argued that his judgment "related back" to the earlier
date of attachment and hence was the prior lien. His argument was overruled by the Supreme
Court in the above opinion. Interestingly, this decision has not become reliable authority even on
the precise type of question involved in the suit, namely; the preferment of a tax lien over an
earlier attachment. Since Justice Minton reached his conclusion that an attachment was merely a
"caveat of a more perfect lien to come" under California law, courts in other jurisdictions have
felt free to distinguish this precedent on the ground that the law relating to attachments in their
states is different. United States v. Acri, 109 F.Supp. 943 (N.D. Ohio 1952), af'd. -F.2d - (6th Cir.
1953) 54-1 USTC 9225; Hawkins v. Savage, 110 F.Supp. 615 (D. Alaska 1953), appeal pending
to 9th Cir.; Standard Brass & Mfg. Co. v. Jefferson Chemical Co., (Tex. 1953) 53-2 USTC 9505;
Sunnyland Wholesale Furniture Co. v. Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co., 107 F.Supp. 405
(N.D. Tex. 1952), al'd. sub nom. United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co.,
- F.2d - (5th Cir. 1954), 54-1 USTC 9132.
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or a surety has no control over these circumstances or, as a matter of fact, over
making the payment pursuant to the guarantee, he is entitled to a lien to
secure his credit as of the time it is made. To relegate him to the date of
the actual payment of money under the pre-existing guarantee is to ignore
"the realities of the situation." Just as a mortgagee pledged to make future
advances is entitled to priority over tax liens intervening between the dates
of the mortgage and of the advances, a surety ought by analogy to be
entitled to the same treatment. 6
Therefore, to hold that the surety's lien "relates back" to the initial date
of the suretyship relation is not to place form above substance; in view of
the above equities, there is reason and policy behind such a result. The
Security Trust case, supra, is no necessary bar to this approach. It is distin-
guishable from the present problem on both its facts and its reasoning.
Factually, it concerned an attaching creditor who was seeking to reduce his
claim to judgment. After he secured his judgment he asked that its priority
be related back to the date of the attachment secured at the time he filed suit.
Since his position as a creditor had changed not one whit since he had ex-
tended credit to the debtor, he was scarcely in an equitable position to demand
the benefit of "relation back."77 Furthermore, the Security Trust decision
rests upon an interpretation of the words "judgment creditor" as used in
section 3672 of the Code. Briefly, to explain the context of the decision, that
section protects "judgment creditors" from the force of the federal tax lien
until the latter is filed for record as required by state law. Since Security
Trust had attached before the federal lien had been filed for record, it
argued that the term "judgment creditor" included an "attaching creditor"
who later got judgment. As we have previously indicated, this argument
failed: the judgment later secured did not relate back. Thus the case's reason-
ing can have no application to a surety. Neither section 3672 nor a "judgment
creditor's" status nor an attachment is involved in the surety-government
priority dispute.7"
The concept of subrogation further buttresses the surety's priority
position. Having paid the claims of certain creditors, the surety is entitled
to assert their respective liens as against competing claimants.79 If the claim-
"
0 Peoples Bank v. United States, 98 F.Supp. 874, 876 (N.D. Ga. 1950) rev'd on another point
sub nom. United States v. Peoples Bank, 197 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1952). And see United States v.
Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1946); Brown v. General Laundry Services, Inc., (Conn.
1952) 53-1 USTC ff 9272.
"The Security Trust case has been factually distinguished and therefore not applied to a sub-
sequent surety vs. United States priority controversy. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
United States, supra note 50.
'Also, see note 75 supra, outlining, with citations, a further defect in the Security Trust case.
Because the Supreme Court paid so much attention to California law in arriving at its conclusion,
other courts have felt free to ignore it as precedent when dealing with the law of attachment in
other states.9See 50 Ar. Ju., Subrogation §§ 110, et seq.
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ants paid off, therefore, had a lien superior to the government's, the surety
ought by right to be preferred."0
Moreover, in view of the motivating purpose of the suretyship transac-
tion-to protect the owner against default and against liens-the surety has
been subrogated to the owner's rights to the retained balance as well as to
the rights of the paid-off creditors. One of these rights is the right of set-off-
to set-off against the claim of the contractor for the balance of any moneys
or claims owed by the contractor to the owner. The owner, however, has no
actual right of set-off, since under the circumstances outlined, he has suffered
no loss. Only the surety, which has made good, has been injured. Despite this
fact, the surety, by some anomalous and unexpressed step of reasoning, is
permitted to assert this inchoate and unaccrued right of the owner's in order
to cover its own right of reimbursement against the contractor. Since a right
of set-off is superior even to a federal tax lien,"' any court which analyzes
the situation in these terms must find for the surety. 2
Thus the surety has been almosi uniformly successful in jousting with
the government for prior payment out of the retained balance.8" Ill-expressed
in their reasoning as some of these cases may be, their conclusion, as pointed
out above, Seems fair and sound. It is one thing to argue that specific employ-
ment taxes allocated to a particular job are a charge against a surety; it is
another to claim that a general tax liability reduced to lien status is a pre-
ferred charge against the balance of the contract price owing. In the former,
"°See American Fidelity Co. v. Delaney, supra note 16. In its haste to prefer the surety, the
court made no analysis of the respective priorities between the United States and the satisfied
creditor to whose rights the surety was subrogated. It merely found that the surety's rights were
greater than those of the insolvent contractor to the retained price and hence it was to be preferred.
"
1United States v. Winnett, 165 F.2d 149, 151 (9th Cir. 1947); Karno-Smith Co. v. Maloney,
112 F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir. 1940); United States v. Long Island Drug Co., 115 F.2d 983, 986
(2d Cir. 1940) ; United States v. Bank of United States, 5 F.Supp. 942 (S.D. N.Y. 1934) ; United
States v. Bank of Shelby, 68 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1934). Compare, Commonwealth Bank v. United
States, 115 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1940), and Seaboard Surety Co. v. United States, 67 F.Supp. 969
(Ct.CL 1946). As indicated in the discussion of this problem in 41 CALiF. L. lav. 241, 250-252 (1953)
the right of set-off, even where asserted by one entitled to it, may not be absolute.
"
2Reaching this result on this analysis are United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United
States, supra note 50, and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority,
(1947) 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d 226. The former decision, being entered after the Security Trust
case, supra, distinguished that particular holding by noting that in the attachment controversy
the mutual debtor owned the property sought to be liened, whereas in the surety conflict the de-
faulting contractor had merely a claim to funds held by the owner. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
reasoned, the attachment precedent had no application, since in the suretyship relation the owner
had a right of set-off superior to creditor's claims and liens against the defaulting contractor.
"
3Not only as to the principal amount paid out by it but as to interest as well. Glenn v. Ameri-
can Surety Co., 160 F.2d 977, 981 (6th Cir. 1947). See National Surety Co. v. Barth, supra note 51.
There the lower court found for the surety, since the rights of the United States were derived through
the defaulting contractor and could rise no higher than his! To foot one of two competing creditors
with the shoe of an insolvent debtor and thereby to prefer the creditor not so shod is to decide
priority controversies by metaphor rather than by reason and policy. Similar language is contained
in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, and in United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority, both supra note 82.
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the equities may be with the government; in the latter, clearly the govern-
ment has no equity greater than that possessed by any general creditor seeking
assets to levy upon. The surety had long before pledged its credit to the
owner for his protection on the very job which has produced the fund now
sought to be distrained for taxes. Under these circumstances it is not strange
that the courts, some astutely, some obtusely, have favored the surety by per-
mitting it to be the first to be served from the retained balance pie.
Conclusion.
Thus it must be apparent to even the most optimistic of the service
policymakers that their drive against sureties is going badly. None of the
three Courts of Appeals to which the question has been presented has ruled
that a surety's bond insuring "wages" includes employment taxes, even if
those taxes are withheld from gross wages. The two federal district courts
(out of five) which have agreed with the government were reversed; only a
decision of the Delaware court stands as a precedent for the tax collector's
position. About all that remains to be done is for the government to concede
the point.
More conflict of opinion can be found on the other questions presented
in this article. Enough has been said to indicate to any surety that it must
proceed cautiously when negotiating an agreement with its principal and the
owner for the completion of a job defaulted on by the principal. More is
involved for a surety than merely minimizing losses; any plan for proceeding
must take into account the possibility of incurring additional liability for em-
ployment taxes. The traps for the unwary surety are many. Although the
government's box score has not been high, it seems obvious that a surety could
quite easily bring itself within the scope of the employment tax acts by its
own conduct. But on the other hand, by a careful analysis of the situation and
of the law, the same surety may practically ensure its freedom from an ex
post facto assessment of employment taxes against it.
It is for the latter class of surety that this article is written. May it
prove effective for this purpose.
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